PREVENT(ing) Radicalisation in Educational Settings

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Structure of Talk

Introduction

Part 1: PREVENT


Part 3: Q & A
Part 1
PREVENT
PREVENT: Definition

PREVENT – ‘A multi-disciplinary, cross departmental strand of the government’s CONTEST strategy designed to provide a holistic response to the full spectrum of terrorist risks and threats’ (Innes et al, 2011: 11).

Right, left-wing; jihadist-inspired; ethno-nationalist & separatist, etc.

Not police owned – societal responsibility
There is no accepted definition of extremism; however...

The PREVENT strategy outlines extremism* as: ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’ (HM Government, 2013b: 2).

*Including non-violent

Of note, the concept of extremism has been expanded to include ‘calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas’ (HM Government, 2013b: 2)
CONTEST

The UK’s counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST is made up of:

- **PREVENT**
  - Pre- 7/7 - least developed strand
  - ‘Pre-criminal’ space
  - Criminal space

- **PURSUE**
  - Post- 7/7 - present - most extensive counter-radicalisation policy in the world

- **PROTECT**
  - Critical National Infrastructure – attack as imminent

- **PREPARE**
  - [elements of CONTEST owned by the police]

[Overt ‘responsibilisation’ / Societal]
PREVENT: Objectives

- The principal objectives of PREVENT are to:

1. Incapacitate radicalisation;
2. ‘Discourage people from becoming terrorists’ (HM Government 2009a, 56); and
3. To ‘challenge extremist ideologies which can be made to justify terrorism’ (HM Government 2011: 25).

*Extremism includes violent and non-violent (revision of PREVENT in 2011)*
PREVENT Objectives: 3 I’s

- **Ideology** - respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it;
- **Individuals** - prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and
- **Institutions** - work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address (HM Government, 2011).
PREVENT & Controversies
Two Broad Criticisms:
Historically

PREVENT: ‘a multi-disciplinary, cross departmental strand of the government’s CONTEST strategy intended to provide a **holistic** response to the **full** spectrum of terrorist risks and threats’ (Innes et al., 2011: 11)

- 5% Muslim population density (Pre-2011)
- Spying / targeting / ‘othering’ / Islamophobia
PREVENT & Controversies
Two Broad Criticisms: Contemporarily

• ‘Securitising’ community relations, speech and even thought(s) - the ‘chilling effect’ on discussion, open debate, free speech, political dissent, and religious issues (Rights Watch, 2017)

• Engagement with pupils, and positive reinforcement are crucial
  - Identity and diversity
  - Community and sense of belonging to different groups
  - Young people should feel confident, comfortable and safe discussing and sharing

- Spike in hate crimes post terrorist attacks
PREVENT Guidance

‘Schools should be safe spaces in which children and young people can understand and discuss sensitive topics, including terrorism and the extremism ideas that are part of terrorist ideology, and learn how to challenge these ideas’ (HM Government, 2015: 14)

1. Students must feel safe at school; safe space to discuss
2. Students must understand broad context of all types of extremism
3. Limiting engagement, conversation and dialogue reduces opportunity for understanding and engagement around complicated discussions

However, be mindful: aim to secure a balanced presentation of political ideas
Terrorism: Mythology

- ...the extent to which we are in the midst of a jihadist uprising has been questioned (see May, 2017)

- Jihadist terrorist violence in the UK has increased over the last few years. **Agree or Disagree?**

- In 2016, in the UK, there were no failed, foiled or completed attacks associated with Jihadist-related violence (Europol, 2017).

- In 2016, ‘142 failed, foiled and completed attacks across the EU. Over half (76) were in the UK with all of these taking place in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, 99 were carried out by ethno-nationalist and separatist extremists (Europol, 2017).
Terrorism: Mythology

- Increasing trend of right-wing violence across Europe over the past two years. However, due to definitional inconsistency, certain instances have not “qualified” as terrorist violence, thus underplaying the threat from right-wing terrorist violence.

- 2017 has been very different; contrasts downward trend in jihadist terrorist violence (in the UK).

- North East profile – threat level and risk(s)...?
Part 2

COUNTER-TERRORISM AND SECURITY ACT (2015)
‘Authorities claim that schools are a fruitful recruiting ground for those involved in extremism of all types. The Government wants teachers to take an active role in identifying children at risk’ (Morrison, 2010, para. 1).
In the UK, the “School Inspection Handbook” (2014) states, in terms of the behaviour and safety of pupils at the school, that Ofsted inspectors should now consider:

‘The extent to which pupils are able to understand, respond to and calculate risk effectively, for example risks associated with child sexual exploitation, domestic violence, female genital mutilation, forced marriage and substance misuse, gang activity, radicalisation and extremism and are aware of the support available to them’ (2014: 54).
From 1 July 2015, all schools, registered early years childcare providers and registered later years childcare providers are subject to a duty* under section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, in the exercise of their functions, to have ‘due regard* to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’. (HM Government 2016: 2).
PREVENT as Safeguarding

Home Office and Department for Education (DfE), have argued explicitly that the duty *doesn’t and shouldn’t stop schools from discussing controversial issues* (Williams, 2015). They have urged educationalists to think of the duty as an *addition to existing safeguarding responsibilities* – an interpretation also favoured by the National Association of Head-Teachers (NAHT) (Busher, et al., 2017: 9).

It is now expected that the PREVENT duty is incorporated into ‘existing policies and procedures, so it becomes part of the day-to-day work of the authority’ (HM Government 2016, 6; emphasis added).
PREVENT as Safeguarding

The DfE’s Departmental Advice for Schools and Childcare Providers states:

‘Protecting children from the risk of radicalisation should be seen as part of schools’ and childcare providers’ wider safeguarding duties, and is similar in nature to protecting children from other harms (e.g. drugs, gangs, neglect, sexual exploitation), whether these come from within their family or are the product of outside influence’ (DfE, 2015: 5)
“Due Regard...”

From 1 July 2015, all schools, registered early years childcare providers and registered later years childcare providers are subject to a duty under section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, in the exercise of their functions, to have ‘due regard’ to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’. (HM Government 2016: 2).
Point 1: “Due Regard” … Who does this apply to?

The Prevent duty attaches to the governors and/or proprietors of schools and colleges, not to the individuals who work in them. Therefore, teachers are not obliged to ‘have due regard’ to the statutory duty. However, teachers are likely to be subject to an express or implied contractual obligation to take such steps as the school or college deems necessary to meet its statutory duty (see HM Government, 2014).
The term “due regard” means certain bodies are now ‘subject to provisions’ when they ‘consider all the other factors relevant to how they carry out their usual functions’ (HM Government 2016, 2); hence, “safeguarding”.

Importantly, this is without conferring “new functions on any specified authority” (HM Government 2016, 2). Authorities ‘should demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalisation in the area, institution or body’ (HM Government 2016: 2 as cited in Dresser, forthcoming: 8).
Point 2: “Due Regard” … What does this mean?

Advice:

- Areas across the UK differ in their threat/risk level. Cater support, knowledge and understanding based on local profile.
  - Police: Counter-terrorism local profiles (CTLPs)
  - Local Authority knowledge(s) – Partnership work

- Each institution will respond to their specific needs and profile - there is no one-size-fits-all model
The glossary of terms contained in the statutory PREVENT duty guidance says ‘having due regard’ means that schools and colleges ‘should place an appropriate amount of weight on the need to prevent people being drawn into terrorism’ when they consider all the other factors relevant to how they carry out their usual functions (see HM Government, 2014).
Point 4: “Due Regard” … What does this mean?

Due regard i.e. awareness of PREVENT Provision.

Things to consider:

1. What does your PREVENT policy look like?
2. What support / student engagement do you have?
3. Are you consulting with parents?

Institutional and Individual provision
**Individual Provision**

- **Staff** - training, support, guidance
  - Addressing issues within the classroom i.e. curricular-based
  - Do staff exemplify fundamental British values in teaching?
  - Do staff understand vulnerability/ ‘at risk’ factors? Can they challenge ideas that legitimise terrorism?
  - Can staff recognise vulnerability and what action to take?
  - Are staff comfortable making a referral? Do they know how to make a referral and **what happens next?**

- **Parents** - consultation and education sessions
  - Are parents reassured about the PREVENT model in place?
  - Are parents aware of support mechanism(s) available?
  - Are parents familiar with the intentions of PREVENT? Debunking myths plays an important role

- **Pupils** - regular engagement, an **embedded curriculum** and advice on support.
  Provision both inside and outside of the school community
  - Embedded in curriculum throughout year e.g. tutor time activities rather than one-off ‘drop-down’ sessions

(Department for Education, 2015)
Institutional Provision

- **Policy Development** - General Themes: risk assessment; Safeguarding I.T. policies; PREVENT

- **Risk Assessment** - Action Plan with local partners to assess risk in local area. Coincides with robust safeguarding policies to identify individuals ‘at risk’.

- Risk assessment of external speakers and events (existing duty of freedom of speech)

- **I.T** - policy relating to PREVENT (specific reference/inclusion)? Firewall system in place to block extremist websites (appropriate levels of filtering including Wi-Fi access)

- **Partnership Work** –
  - Is there active engagement from staff in leadership positions; Governors, etc.?
  - Is there an Identified Single Point of contact (SPOC) for PREVENT?
  - Does the institution engage with Regional PREVENT Coordinators; Local Authority PREVENT leads; Local PREVENT Boards/Steering Group?

- **Referral Pathway Knowledge** – How are safeguarding cases managed in the Local Authority in relation to PREVENT?

  (Department for Education, 2015)
PREVENT: Referral Pathway

1. Identify risk
Seek support and advice
Consultation is crucial

2. Designated Safeguarding Lead
Safeguarding concern identified? (re: PREVENT)

3. Referred to Local Authority
Might go to local PREVENT CHANNEL Panel or alternative

4. Local PREVENT CHANNEL Panel
Assessment of evidence. Threshold for anti-radicalisation support crossed?

Type of Support?

Institutional response

Decisions made in partnership
Types of Support

- Mentoring support contact: with a suitable adult as a role model or providing personal guidance, including guidance addressing extremism ideologies;
- Life skills: work on life skills or social skills generally, such as dealing with peer pressure;
- Anger management session: formal or informal work dealing with anger;
- Cognitive/behavioural contact: cognitive behavioural therapies and general work;
- Constructive pursuits: supervised or managed constructive leisure activities;
- Education skills contact: activities focused on education or training;
- Careers contact: activities focused on employment;
- Family support contact: activities aimed at supporting family and personal relationships, including formal parenting programmes;
- Health awareness contact: work aimed at assessing or addressing any physical or mental health issues;
- Housing support contact: activities addressing living arrangements, accommodation provision or neighbourhood; and
- Drugs and alcohol awareness: substance misuse interventions.
Screening Referrals
- Screen referral to ensure there is a specific vulnerability around radicalisation and the referral is not malicious or misinformed;
- Maintain proper record

Not Appropriate

Appropriate

Assessment
- Determine suitability (alternative support mechanisms)
- Collective assessment of vulnerability and risk
- Review panel decisions at 6 and 12 months

Seek endorsement

Multi-Agency Panel
- Review of vulnerability assessment and risk
- Collective assessment of support needs
- Develop action plan
- Identify and procure appropriate support package
- Review progress

Review

Delivery of Support

(HM Government, 2012b)
Why is this Important?

- S. 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015) also states that “frontline staff” e.g. NHS, DfE, etc., are to be trained to recognise vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism and are aware of available programmes to deal with this issue” (HM Government 2016, 7; emphasis added; see also Dresser, 2015).
Point 9 of Action/Risk Plan: Safeguarding

1. Is protection against the risk of radicalisation and extremism included within Safeguarding and other relevant policies?

2. Do Safeguarding and welfare staff receive additional and ongoing training to enable the effective understanding and handling of referrals relating to radicalisation and extremism?

3. Does the institution utilise CHANNEL as a support mechanism in cases of radicalisation and extremism?

4. Does the institution have a policy regarding a referral to CHANNEL identifying a recognised pathway and threshold for referral?

Why is this Important?
Vulnerability Assessment Framework: How do I Identify Risk?

1. **Engagement with a group, cause or ideology**
   - Susceptibilities, motivations and contextual factors

2. **Intent to cause harm**
   - Individual’s mindset

3. **Capability to cause harm**
   - What the individual is actually capable of doing

(HM Government, 2012b)
Engagement factors are sometimes referred to as “psychological hooks”. They include needs, susceptibilities, motivations and contextual influences and together map the individual pathway into terrorism. They can include:

- Feelings of grievance and injustice
- Feeling under threat
- A need for identity, meaning and belonging
- A desire for status
- A desire for excitement and adventure
- A need to dominate and control others
- Susceptibility to indoctrination
- A desire for political or moral change
- Opportunistic involvement
- Family or friends involvement in extremism
- Being at a transitional time of life
- Being influenced or controlled by a group
- Relevant mental health issues

Non-exceptional risk indicators.

Reports/referrals from educational settings have dramatically increased

Common sense approach - seek advice

(HM Government, 2012b)
2. **Intent to cause harm**

Not all those who become engaged by a group, cause or ideology go on to develop an intention to cause harm, so this dimension is considered separately. Intent factors describe the mindset that is associated with a readiness to use violence and address what the individual would do and to what end. They can include:

- Over-identification with a group or ideology
- ‘Them and Us’ thinking
- Dehumanisation of the enemy
- Attitudes that justify offending
- Harmful means to an end
- Harmful objectives

(HM Government, 2012b)
3. **Capability to cause harm**

Not all those who have a wish to cause harm on behalf of a group, cause or ideology are capable of doing so, and plots to cause widespread damage take a high level of personal capability, resources and networking to be successful. What the individual is capable of is therefore a key consideration when assessing risk of harm to the public. Factors can include:

- Individual knowledge, skills and competencies
- Access to networks, funding or equipment

(HM Government, 2012b)
Reporting Concerns

Educational setting(s):

- Designated Safeguard Lead - First possible opportunity
- DfE (Due diligence and counter extremism group) helpline - 020 7340 7264 - counter.extremism@education.gsi.gov.uk
Conclusion

- PREVENT is now a compulsory duty - you are bound by legal obligation

- Become educated on PREVENT - you could be asked by OFSTED. Be proactive

- PREVENT adapts/modify regularly - this is an ongoing learning activity for you and your institution. PREVENT is done in partnership. Seek regular advice, the support is there

- Be flexible - have a bank of resources at hand

- You are educating citizens in training with critical thinking skills
Part 3
Q & A
References


Further Resources

- The following resources are available to find out more about the Prevent strategy:
  
  **The PREVENT strategy:**
  
  
  
  - http://www.preventtragedies.co.uk/

  **The PREVENT Duty:**
  
  - Prevent duty guidance - Publications - GOV.UK:
  
  - http://www.preventforfeandtraining.org.uk/

Prevent duty guidance

Guidance for specified authorities in England and Wales on the duty in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.
1. The Prevent Strategy, 2011
2. CONTEST: the United Kingdom’s strategy for countering terrorism
3. Prevent duty guidance

England:
4. Working together to Safeguard Children
5. Keeping Children Safe in Education
6. Care Act 2014:
7. Care Act Factsheets
8. Public Sector Data Sharing – Guidance on the Law
http://www.dca.gov.uk/foi/sharing/toolkit/lawguide.pdf
9. Information Commissioner’s Office Guidance on Interpretation of the DPA
10. Confidentiality Code of Practice
12. Information Sharing: Advice for practitioners providing safeguarding services to children, young people, parents and carers
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/safeguarding-practitioner-information-sharing-advice
13. www.safecampuscommunities.ac.uk

Wales:
Safeguarding children: Working together under the Children Act 2004:
15. Keeping learners safe provides advice on radicalisation and supplements the above welsh guidance on safeguarding children