Counter-Radicalisation Through Safeguarding: A Political Analysis of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015)

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Abstract

The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (CTSA) mandates specified authorities to demonstrate due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism; what is better known as the ‘PREVENT Duty’. As part of this duty, public sector workers are required to identify a person’s proclivity for radicalisation, and, in turn, report concerns as a safeguarding measure. Drawing upon Rose and Miller’s matrix of political analysis, this article explores the PREVENT Duty through three theoretical areas: political rationalities; problematisations; and technologies of government. Framing the CTSA as a political rationality helps conceptualise the justifications and exercise of power in and between diverse authorities. Central to this is the way problematisations of risks connect to forms of knowledge, practices and technologies which become reproblematised and (de)politicised to create (un)stable assemblages of (in)security. The utility of governmental technologies helps situate PREVENT as it permeates the actuarial practices of mundane social care environments. Related to this, I draw attention to the governance of PREVENT which, I argue, is realised discursively through language. Through these theoretical frameworks I explore PREVENT as having undergone a process of rectification; this entails the mutation of PREVENT towards safeguarding. At a broader level, this article contributes to a reconstituted understanding of PREVENT by examining the intertwining of social care structures and counter-radicalisation.

Keywords: PREVENT, PREVENT Duty, radicalisation, safeguarding, political analysis

Introduction

In little over a decade the practices of counter-terrorism have undergone significant reform. Central to this development is the UK PREVENT programme which has reconfigured
counter-terrorism towards visible and overt counter-radicalisation methods. PREVENT is broadly defined as ‘a multi-disciplinary, cross departmental strand of the government’s CONTEST strategy intended to provide a holistic response to the full spectrum of terrorist risks and threats’ (Innes et al., 2011: 11). In exploring PREVENT, academics have situated counter-radicalisation as a deployment of anticipatory security through the identification of ‘at risk’ individuals.2 ‘At risk’ individuals occupy a non-criminal space but are nevertheless considered vulnerable to extremism. The conceptual underpinning of PREVENT is thus temporally pre-emptive; as the PREVENT strategy makes clear: ‘they (programmes to support at risk individuals) should pre-empt and not facilitate law enforcement activity’ (HM Government, 2011a: 8; adapted by present author). To this end, PREVENT involves security agents, multi-agency partnerships, and the lay public; hence, the reframing of PREVENT as a whole-of-society approach.

While PREVENT has been central to counter-terrorism since its original iteration in 2006, of particular interest to this article is section 26(1) of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015; [CTSA hereafter]). The CTSA imposed a legal requirement on certain bodies (‘specified authorities’ set out under Schedule 6 of the CTSA) to demonstrate, inter alia, ‘due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ (HM Government, 2015b: 2); better known as the ‘PREVENT Duty’.3 The term ‘due regard’ means public sector workers are required to ‘demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalisation in the area, institution or body’ (HM Government, 2015b: 2).4 This includes identifying a person’s proclivity for extremist ideologies and, in turn, report concerns. It is pertinent to note that within this framework PREVENT is contextualised as a pre-existing safeguarding measure (see HM Government, 2015b). As a governing intervention,

3 Throughout this paper reference to HM Government (2015a and b) highlights statutory advice as part of legislation, whereas reference to the DfE, for example, reflects non-statutory guidance.
4 Detailed guidance is issued under section 29 of the CTSA.
safeguarding is the processes of protecting vulnerable individuals with care and support needs, as well as minimising harms and abuses such as domestic violence, and forced marriage. *Departmental Advice for Schools and Childcare Providers* captures this (re)framing of PREVENT:

‘Protecting children from the risk of radicalisation should be seen as part of schools’ and childcare providers’ wider safeguarding duties, and is similar in nature to protecting children from other harms (e.g. drugs, gangs, neglect, sexual exploitation), whether these come from within their family or are the product of outside influence’ (Department for Education [DfE hereafter], 2015: 5).

This article explores PREVENT with a particular focus on the CTSA. As a caveat, this article does not critically consider the ethical implications of PREVENT(ing) through safeguarding, or the shifting mechanics of suspicion. Coppock and McGovern, for instance, argue normalised technologies employed in counter-radicalisation strategies aimed at safeguarding vulnerable individuals are ‘underpinned by essentialised and racialised constructions of “childhood vulnerability” and bolstered by pseudo-scientific psychology of radicalisation discourse’ (2014: 252). Nor does this article explore criticisms associated with internal practices of spying and ‘Othersing’ practices of surveillance (see Kundnani, 2009; Durodie, 2016). Whilst I acknowledge security discourses can produce a ‘complex gendered and racialised architecture of abnormality and pathology’ (Campbell, 1992: 94 cited in Aradua and Blanke, 2018: 5), an analysis of such does not formulate the context to this article.

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5 The concept of safeguarding significantly pre-dates the CTSA. Various pieces of legislation and guidance are relevant including: the 1989 Children Act; the National Health Services’ (NHS hereafter) ‘No Secrets’ document; and the 2014 Care Act.

6 The CTSA has been the focus of much media attention and public debate, with concerns raised around PREVENT exacerbating a ‘chilling effect’ on open discussion, free speech and political dissent (see Dudenhoefer, 2018). Writing about contemporary education, Durodie (2016) frames PREVENT as a securitising effort.

7 See Dudenhoefer (2018) for an analysis of the PREVENT Duty in the context of ‘safe spaces’.
This article presents an alternative reading of counter-radicalisation as ‘safeguarding’ given research has been less attentive to theoretically unpacking this epistemic shift. To situate the argument within a wider context, I begin by outlining the UK PREVENT strategy, including the aims and objectives of PREVENT. Second, I document the implementation of the CTSA with the reconfiguration of PREVENT as ‘safeguarding’ providing a contextual framework. Of note, a more thorough, historical examination of PREVENT is beyond the boundaries of this article. The following sections explore Rose and Miller’s political analysis within the oeuvre of Foucault’s ‘governmentality’. In its broadest sense, governmentality encompasses:

‘Institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument’ (Foucault, 2007: 144).

Analysing the problematics of government, Rose and Miller (1992) outline two primary areas of political analysis: political rationalities, and technologies of government.8 The former entails the ‘changing discursive fields within which the exercise of power is conceptualised, the moral justifications for particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 273). The notion of political rationality lends support to the ways in which problematisations of risks9 and threats connect to certain forms of knowledge, practices, technologies, and affects, to create (un)stable assemblages of (in)security (Wichum, 2013: 164; emphasis added). Thereafter, I introduce the concept of ‘problematisation’; that is, ‘how problems come to be defined ... in relation to particular schemes of thought, diagnosis of

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8 In a different vein, Elshimi (2015, 2017) provides a novel analysis of deradicalisation framed as ‘technologies of the self’.

9 I am following Rose’s description of risk as ‘a family of ways of thinking and acting, involving calculations about probable futures in the present followed by interventions into the present in order to control that potential future’ (2001: 7).

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deficiency and promises of improvement’ (Li, 2007: 264). Central to this is the construction of knowledge which is rendered technical and depoliticised; how alliances are forged; and how problems become ‘reproblematised’ (de Goede and Simon, 2013: 319).

While political rationalities are said to be the rules which regulate autonomous systems of meaning making (Wittendorp, 2016), governmental technologies are the means of realising rationalities. Rose and Miller conceptualise governmental technologies as the ‘complex of mundane programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental ambitions’ (1992: 273). In the final section I explore the governance of PREVENT theorised as a technology of government within mundane spaces of everydayness; this, I argue, is realised discursively (and operationally) through language.

I draw connections between these dimensions to posit a conceptual matrix of political analysis constitutes the ontological conditions which redefine PREVENT as safeguarding. Moreover, the oscillation between these dimensions allows for a systematic understanding of PREVENT as ‘interventions in the present in order to control potential future(s)’ (Rose, 2001: 7; adapted by present author). In proffering such arguments, this article reframes PREVENT through theoretical means. Readers are therefore encouraged to interpret the arguments in ways which allow further analytical arguments and/or debates to emerge. At a broader level, this article provides a reconstituted understanding of the non-criminal space by exploring the intertwining of social care structures and counter-radicalisation.

**Preventing Terrorism in the UK: What is PREVENT?**

The PREVENT programme was operationalised in 2006 as part of the cross-government counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST – the UK counter-terrorism strategy implemented in response to an emerging domestic (and international) terrorist threat following the 2005

10 In Foucault’s terms, problematising is ‘the development of a domain of acts, practices, and thoughts that pose problems for politics’ (1984: 384, adapted by present author).
London Bombings (Omand 2010). CONTEST encompasses four strands: PREVENT, PURSUE, PROTECT and PREPARE. The objective of PREPARE is to mitigate the effects of attacks, rapidly bringing any attack to an end, and recovering from it (HM government, 2018a); PROTECT strengthens the national border infrastructure of counter-terrorism capabilities to attack (HM Government, 2009); PURSUE disrupts terrorist threats through targeting known suspects thus coinciding with traditional forms of ‘top-down’ intelligence gathering; finally, PREVENT is said to be more forward-facing. While the other three stands of CONTEST entail clandestine and covert counter-terrorism methods, PREVENT includes ‘bottom-up’ approaches and ‘soft power’ prevention (Nye, 2004). In a governance sense, PREVENT encompasses ‘processes of horizontal decision-making and collaborative modes of governing between public, private, voluntary and community actors’ (Griggs et al., 2014: 2).

Following parliamentary review in June 2011, PREVENT was revised along an axis of three overarching (yet interrelated) objectives: to respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism; to provide support and practical help to prevent individuals from being drawn into terrorism; and to work with a wide range of institutions where there are risks of radicalisation or which support counter-radicalisation work (HM Government, 2011a). In contrast to the original iteration of PREVENT which was centred on Islamic terrorists (HM Government, 2006), the realigned PREVENT objectives are said to address all types of terrorism, though the PREVENT strategy makes clear the greatest risk to the UK is that of al Qaeda-related terrorism (HM Government, 2011b: 59, 6). The latest version of CONTEST (CONTEST3 hereafter) further highlights the increased threat from the rise of Daesh,11 as well as growing threat of right-wing terrorism both to British citizens and interests overseas (HM Government, 2018a).

Turley (2009) outlines the aforementioned objectives are supported by strategic enablers that centre around three types of activity: counter-radicalisation; community cohesion building; and deradicalisation. Counter-radicalisation focuses on inhibiting the

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11 Interchangeably known as Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Islamic State (IS).
spread of extremist ideas. As a cross-community effort, *community cohesion building* is said to increase the resilience of communities to extremist ideologies. Research which explores resilience as multi-dimensional, and as collective endeavour encompassing social structures, community processes and practices provides a more fruitful understanding of this aspect of PREVENT (see c.f. Norris et al., 2008). Finally, *deradicalisation* compromises targeted interventions with individuals whom, while occupying a non-criminal space, are considered ‘at risk’ of adopting extremist ideologies (or have already done so) (Vidino and Brandon, 2012).

The police-run CHANNEL programme (considered an extension of PREVENT) embodies the core instrument of deradicalisation through a multi-agency risk assessment and case management system, itself ‘modelled on other successful multi-agency risk management processes, such as child protection, domestic violence and the management of high risk offenders; it uses processes which also safeguard people at risk from crime, drugs or gangs’ (HM Government, 2011a: 57). Through targeted support, CHANNEL attempts to ‘dissuade individuals from engaging in and supporting terrorist-related activity’ (HM Government, 2011a: 56), as well as reducing the influence of extremist ideas where they have gained traction by ‘removing people from the influence of and contract from with terrorist groups and sympathises’ (HM Government, 2011a: 56). CHANNEL is also concerned with ensuring behavioural changes through other types of support such as life skills, family support contact, and careers contact (see HM Government, 2012c, 2018b). In fact, in 2016/17, statistics demonstrate 45% of individuals referred through PREVENT were signposted to alternative services for support (HM Government, 2018b).

Those considered ‘vulnerable to extremism’ are assessed across three dimensions: ‘engagement with a group, cause or ideology’ (‘psychological hooks’); ‘intent to cause harm’ (‘intent factors’); and ‘capability to cause harm’ (‘capability factors’; HM Government,

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12 CHANNEL has been extended and is now firmly embedded within formal children’s ‘safeguarding’ protocols and practices (HM Government, 2012a). The Home Office is also piloting a new approach to embed common safeguarding procedures through local authorities taking a more active role (HM Government, 2018a).
2012b: 11). Each of these dimensions contain a number of ‘vulnerability indicators’ including (though not limited to): ‘expressed opinions’, ‘material indicators’, and ‘behaviour and behavioural change(s)’ (McGready, 2011). Foregrounding several dispositions of behaviour that serve as proxy indicators of risk reflects the performativity of PREVENT. The conceptual underpinning of counter- and deradicalisation strategies is therefore anticipatory and temporally pre-emptive given the focus on individuals that are considered vulnerable to extremism within a non-criminal space.

This discursive shift towards pre-crime vulnerability cannot be understood outside a discourse of radicalisation. Following the London bombings of July 7 (2005), UK counter-terrorism was re-orientated from foreign policy and border control, and become enmeshed within a domestic realm (Regazzi, 2016). Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) emerged as a capacity building effort through the diffusion of formal responsibilities towards local authorities. Irrespective of compatibility, from 2006-2011, PREVENT was deployed through The Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) which was required to strengthen community resilience and address radicalisation at local level. This was supported by National Indicator 35 (NI35 hereafter) which measured a local authority’s, *inter alia*: ‘understanding of, and engagement with, Muslim communities’ (Association of Police Authorities 2009: 35). Whether an area adopted NI35 as a performance measure, or radicalisation concern(s) had been identified, local areas were required to report regardless.

The devolution of governance towards civil society groups was further consolidated through a policy discourse of community cohesion which pre-dates the London bombings of 2005. The 2001 riots in former industrial towns across Lancashire and Yorkshire were attributed to neighbourliness communities underpinned by polarisation, ontological insecurity, and the rejection of racialised coding of British civic and public culture by young Asian men of second and third generations. Hence the problematising forms of spatial social imaginary in and between communities. What emerged was a narrative of integration and civic identity intertwined with a discourse of radicalisation. While radicalisation is a nebulous and contested term, the PREVENT strategy defines radicalisation ‘as the process by which a person comes
to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism’ (HM Government, 2011a: 3). PREVENT also addresses non-violent extremism which can ‘create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists then exploit’ (HM Government, 2011a: 3). Extremism, on the other hand, is defined as vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’ (HM Government, 2013: 2). This includes ‘calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas’ (HM Government, 2013: 2). CONTEST3 frames extremism as narratives which run contrary to ‘the values of our society’ (HM Government, 2018a: 78) whilst concomitantly emphasising the need to promote ‘pluralistic British values’ (HM Government, 2018a: 78). This demonstrates a seemingly slight, yet significant lexical shift.

The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015)

The introduction of the CTSA in July 2015 imposed the ‘PREVENT Duty’ - a legal requirement on specified authorities to demonstrate due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. Specified authorities are set out under Schedule 6 of the CTSA; these include: local authorities; education bodies; health and social care bodies; prison and probation authorities; and the police. These authorities are now ‘subject to provisions’ when they ‘consider all the other factors relevant to how they carry out their usual functions’ (HM Government, 2015b: 2). Accordingly, the CTSA does not confer ‘new functions on any specified authority’ (HM Government, 2015b: 2); rather, it is expected that the PREVENT Duty is incorporated into ‘existing policies and procedures, so it becomes part of the day-to-day work of the authority’ (HM Government 2015b: 6). It is further stated those in leadership positions (within specified authorities) must ‘establish or use existing mechanisms for understanding the risk of radicalisation’ and ‘ensure staff understand the risk and build the capabilities to deal with it’ (HM Government 2015b: 3). In the context of the DfE, revised guidance outlines the PREVENT Duty attaches to the governors and/or proprietors of schools...
and colleges, and not to the individuals that work in them (HM Government, 2015a). However, practitioners - whatever the authority or institution - are implicated by the duty given the need to ‘demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalisation in the area, institution or body’ (HM Government, 2015b: 2). As advice from the National Union of Teachers (NUT hereafter) explains, ‘teachers are likely to be subject to an express or implied contractual obligation to take such steps as the school or college deems necessary to meet its statutory duty’ (NUT, 2015: 6).

While the CTSA was said to be fast-tracked through Parliament (House of Lords, 2015), it is important not to assume the articulation of the duty only relates to the CTSA. An obligation to prevent radicalisation was already being enforced in schools and colleges via Ofsted through its Common Inspection Framework which pre-dates the CTSA (see Miah, 2017). This followed two high-profile incidents: the ‘trojan horse’ affair; and the downgrading of a London school’s Ofsted rating due to a lack of safeguarding policies in relation to PREVENT. A sector-wide counter-radicalisation response is also evidenced by e-Learning PREVENT packages, and Workshops to Raise Awareness of PREVENT (WRAP hereafter). Developed by the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSTC), WRAP has been operational since 2011. The overarching aim of WRAP is to provide workers from the education sector, health institutions, youth organisations, local authorities, community groups, etc., with an understanding of ‘how and why various partners might signal concerns around polarisation and radicalisation’ (Dresser, 2015: 172). This entails one-day training sessions which, at the time of writing, have been completed over one million times (HM Government, 2018a).

What is particularly apposite to the CTSA is a legislative reframing of PREVENT within a rubric of safeguarding. The Home Office has urged professional practitioners to think of the PREVENT duty (and the ways in which risk is understood and responded to) as ‘an addition to existing safeguarding responsibilities’ (Bushe et al., 2017: 9). Under a pre-

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13 This figure relates to both e-Learning packages and one-day WRAP training.
14 The revised PREVENT strategy (2011) introduced counter-radicalisation as a safeguarding endeavour, whereas the CTSA legislatively consolidated this approach.
existing safeguarding apparatus, the CTSA responsibilises practitioners from the public sector to identify ‘at risk’ individuals’ proclivity for radicalisation and, in turn, raise concerns to their line manager or Designated Safeguarding Lead. In relation to the education sector, Designated Safeguarding Leads undertake PREVENT awareness training and are said to provide advice and support to other members of staff on protecting individuals from the risk of radicalisation (DfE, 2015: 7).

Yet there is more to the CTSA. Alongside a safeguarding approach, the CTSA frames the PREVENT Duty as resilience building against extremist ideologies. The DfE and the Home Office, for example, jointly developed Educate Against Hate - a website designed to protect children from extremist influences online, as well as providing educationalists with ‘the guidance and support they need to protect children from radicalisation and extremism’ (HM Government, 2018a: 37). More pertinently, schools and colleges are statutorily required to actively promote fundamental British values within curriculum content and delivery. Various guidelines have been developed to help teachers develop a curriculum response which incorporates the active promotion of British values (see, for example, Expert Subject Advisory Group for Citizenship, 2015). This has been the subject of much polarised debate, not least because of an interplay between a statutory requirement to identify vulnerable individuals through robust safeguarding policies, alongside a commitment to encourage positive social narratives which helps civic and political participation. Under section 29 of the CTSA, schools and colleges are said to be ‘safe spaces’ in which children and young people can ‘understand and discuss sensitive topics, including terrorism and extremist ideas that are part of terrorist ideology, and learn how to challenge these ideas’ (HM Government, 2015b: 14). This is said to satisfy the need to protect freedom of speech under section 31 of the CTSA (HM Government 2015a) thus adhering to section 43(1) of the Education (No. 2) Act, 1986. Within a higher education context, governing bodies or qualifying institutions must also demonstrate regard to the importance of academic freedom (HM Government, 2015a) referred to in section 202(2)(a) of the Education Reform Act, 1988.

Promoting British values has been part of counter-radicalisation since 2011.

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Coupling vulnerability to radicalisation with a responsibility to safeguard ‘at risk’ individuals provides an overarching protectionist agenda which reconfigures the would-be-terrorist through a discourse of victimhood. The DfE’s *Departmental Advice for Schools and Childcare Providers* makes this clear:

‘Protecting children from the risk of radicalisation should be seen as part of schools’ and childcare providers’ wider safeguarding duties, and is similar in nature to protecting children from other harms (e.g. drugs, gangs, neglect, sexual exploitation), whether these come from within their family or are the product of outside influence’ (DfE, 2015: 5).

As part of this logic, the CTSA embodies an evacuation of pre-fixed, linear profiling that is reflective of previous iterations of PREVENT. Public sector workers are encouraged to use their ‘professional judgement’ (DfE, 2015: 6; Dresser, 2015) in identifying individuals who might be at risk of radicalisation and act proportionately’ (DfE, 2015: 6, adapted by present author). The nature of professional judgement is intertwined with already existing expertise in safeguarding risks (Heath-Kelly, 2017). Where safeguarding concerns have been identified relating to PREVENT, these are referred to the local authority who assess whether or not to forward the case to the local Prevent CHANNEL panel (itself chaired by local authorities and multi-agency in nature). The referral evidence is then examined and a decision is made whether an individual has reached a threshold for anti-radicalisation mentoring (amongst a myriad of other support processes), before a bespoke intervention package is devised.

To fully comply with the PREVENT Duty, specified authorities must evidence productive co-operation with Local PREVENT co-ordinators, the police and local authorities (HM Government, 2015b: 4);\(^{16}\) hence the framing of PREVENT as a ‘collective responsibility’ (HM Government, 2011a: 44). Specified authorities must further demonstrate

\(^{16}\) Local PREVENT co-ordinators are employed by local authorities in government-defined priority areas. Partnership work will naturally be more difficult in non-priority PREVENT areas due to funding restraint (see Dresser, 2018).
‘co-ordination through multi-agency forums, for example Community Safety Partnerships’ (HM Government, 2015b: 4), as made clear in DfE advice:

‘The PREVENT Duty builds on existing local partnership arrangements. Local Safeguarding Children Boards (LSCBs) are responsible for co-ordinating what is done by local agencies for the purposes of safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children in their local area. Safeguarding arrangements should already take into account the policies and procedures of the LSCB. For example, LSCBs publish threshold guidance indicating when a child or young person might be referred for support’ (DfE, 2015: 7).

Finally, the Home Office oversee and centrally monitor the PREVENT Duty (this applies to up to 50 priority PREVENT areas). Amongst other responsibilities, the Home Office ‘draw together data about implementation of PREVENT from local and regional PREVENT co-ordinators (including those in health, further and higher education), the police, intelligence agencies and other departments’ (HM Government, 2015b: 5). Where any specified authority has failed to execute its PREVENT Duty, section 32(A) of the CTSA allows the Secretary of State to enforce the performance of PREVENT.

This section has explored the reconfiguration of PREVENT as safeguarding. There has been a focus on the implementation of CTSA which mandates public sector workers to demonstrate ‘due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ (HM Government, 2015b: 2). As part of this duty, PREVENT is legislatively framed as a pre-existing safeguarding measure similar to broader types of preventable abuse. The article now turns to unpacking this transition using Rose and Miller’s political analysis as a theoretical frame. The following sections are separated into three areas of analysis: ‘political rationality’; ‘problematisations’; and ‘technologies of government’.
PREVENT as Safeguarding: Political Rationality

We begin to understand the reconfiguration of PREVENT as safeguarding through a conceptual lens of ‘political rationality’. Political rationality refers to a ‘discursive field within which the exercise of power is conceptualised,’ which combines ‘justifications for particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities’ with ‘notions of the appropriate forms, objects, and limits of politics, and conceptions of the proper distribution of such tasks’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 175). To be clear, in elucidating PREVENT as a political rationality I am not merely drawing reference to discourse(s) embedded public pronouncements by government actors; rather, the focus is upon ‘discourses found in technical policy papers that deal with governance in a programmatic manner’ (Merlingen, 2011: 152).

On this argument, Rose and Miller outline political rationalities have an ‘epistemological’ character relating to the nature of the object or persons governed i.e. society, the nation, the population, the economy (1992: 227). Drawing upon Paul Veyne, they point out, ‘these can be specified as members of a flock to be led, legal subjects with rights, children to be educated, a resource to be exploited, elements of a population to be managed’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 277, italics in original). The epistemological character of PREVENT is consolidated through an imaginative shift which reconfigures vulnerability to radicalisation as ideological abuse which pre-figures terrorism. This, essentially, situates the would-be-terrorist through a discourse of ‘victimhood’ (Heath-Kelly, 2017). As CONTEST3 makes clear: ‘safeguarding is at the heart of PREVENT’; this ensures ‘our communities and families are not exploited or groomed into following a path of violent extremism’ (HM Government, 2018a: 10). Furthermore, alongside a safeguarding response, the PREVENT Duty is geared towards building resilience against extremism and thus, the development of critical stances and strategies to resist extremist messages. In an educational context, building pupils’ resilience is said to ‘promote pupils’ welfare’17 (DfE, 2015: 5) as part of ‘broader

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17 I also acknowledge the converse argument regarding a shift from welfarism to a security-orientated practice.
requirements relating to the quality of education and to promoting the spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of pupils’ (HM Government, 2015b: 10). Within this, the Independent Schools Standards obligates schools and colleges to promote fundamental British values within curriculum content and delivery. This, inevitably, implicates individuals Kennelly (2010) terms ‘citizens-in-development’ (and thus requiring management).

CHANNEL is instructive here. While CHANNEL is not exclusively geared towards safeguarding children and young people from radicalisation and/or extremism, statistics relating to individuals referred to and supported through PREVENT demonstrate those aged 20 and under as the largest demographic (see HM Government, 2017 and 2018b). Of the 7,631 individuals referred in 2015-16, the majority (4,274; 56%) were aged 20 years or under (HM Government, 2017). There was a marginal increase in 2016-17 with 3,487 individuals aged 20 years or under referred, making up 57% of referrals overall (HM Government, 2018b). Home Office statistics also demonstrate that in 2015-16, those aged 20 years or under were the largest cohort discussed for appropriateness of CHANNEL intervention at CHANNEL Panel meetings (HM Government, 2017). This trend continued in 2016-17; of the 1,146 individuals discussed at a CHANNEL panel, those aged 20 years of under made up the majority (697; 61%), while 332 individuals aged 20 years or under received CHANNEL support (226; 68%; HM Government, 2018b). At this point it is important to reiterate that deradicalisation does not only entail theological and/or ideological mentoring; CHANNEL is as much concerned with citizens’ welfare through, for example, careers advice; education skills contact; constructive pursuits; and housing support (see HM Government, 2012c, 2018b). This maps well to Rose and Miller’s characterisation of political rationality which considers welfarism ‘through the promotion of social responsibility and the mutuality of social risk’ (1992: 290). While welfarism is considered a responsibilising mode of government, importantly, the governing networks of welfare are not a coherent mechanism that enables the unfolding of a central plan but an assemblage of diverse and antagonistic components (Rose and Miller, 1992). Power in this sense is not monolithic nor does it emanate from a ‘centralised point’ (Foucault, 2003: 203).
For Rose and Miller, the governing networks of welfare were not a state apparatus but ‘a composition of fragile and mobile relationships and dependencies making diverse attempts to link the aspirations of authorities with the lives of individuals. Assembling and maintaining such networks entailed struggles’ (1992: 290). This reflects Foucault’s inexorable turn to seeing power as diffused, decentralised, and arranged in microphysical relations (Cote, 2007). Eschewing the concept of power as a single centre, Foucault exhorted that the juridical model of sovereignty be abandoned, instead emphasising the need to study the micro-diversity of power.  

Likewise, while the CTSA responsibilises specified authorities for counter-radicalisation, legislatively reconfiguring PREVENT as dispersed and multi-layered brings with it sites of resistance, dogmatism and fracture (c.f. Fussey, 2013; O’ Toole et al., 2016; Thomas, 2017; Dresser, 2015, 2018). For instance, in March 2016, the NUT voted overwhelming to reject the PREVENT strategy as part of Ofsted inspection. Furthermore, commenting on a lack of trust between the NHS and the police, the former Metropolitan Police’s Assistant Commissioner for Specialist Operations and Head of National Counter Terror Policy, Mark Rowley, stressed: ‘we have to work together, and it requires a bit more trust and collaboration between us’ (Knapton, 2017: 1). These observations are not entirely novel; as the PREVENT strategy outlines: ‘we are concerned that some universities and colleges have failed to engage in PREVENT. This lack of engagement must be addressed’ (HM Government, 2011a: 75-76).

How structure and agency operate and relate in a non-criminal space is thus analytically important. This challenges McDonald and Hunter who frame PREVENT as ‘an elaborate network of agents, agencies, and procedures who engaged in practice of security, melded together in joint pursuit of each other’s interests’ (2013: 128; adapted by present author). The wide array of institutions responsibilised through the CTSA have far more

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18 And, indeed, the study of localised, strategic systems.
19 The Royal College of Psychiatrists have also expressed concern of PREVENT (see Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2016).
historical depth than the notion of “node” or “point” - as connoted by network – suggests. A more nuanced account of PREVENT must consider the contested empirical reality of counter-terrorism governance. Doing so helps move beyond concretised versions of governmentality which, Bevir (2011: 462) notes, ‘rarely examine agency as a source of discourses or as evidenced in specific instances of counter power’.

Yet there is more to the CTSA than this epistemological characterisation. Because political rationalities are concerned both with framing a social problem as in need of rectification and providing a governmental framework through which it can be addressed, ‘they have a characteristically moral form’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 226). As Rose and Miller succinctly put it, political rationalities are concerned with ‘the formulation and justification of idealised schemata for representing reality, analysing it, and rectifying it’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 178; emphasis added). This concerns the ‘fitting powers’ and ‘duties’ between a diverse range of authorities (Rose and Miller, 1992: 276). Within this, ‘moral form’ considers ‘the ideals or principles to which government should be directed’ (Stockdale, 2014: 178-9, 100-101). In considering the moral characterisation of political rationalities, Foucault’s later analysis of thinking as a situated practice of critical reflection is instructive. Drawing upon Foucault, Collier outlines critical reflection establishes a certain distance from existing forms of acting and understanding and ‘works to remediate and recombine these forms’ (2009: 80). Discussing the effects driving new topologies of power, Foucault draws attention to thinking as a response to situated problems (Collier, 2009). Importantly, such occurrences are situated amid upheaval, in sites of problematisation in which existing forms have lost their coherence and their purchase in addressing present problems, and in which ‘new forms of understanding and acting have to be invented’ (Collier, 2009: 95). Mitchell Dean refers to this as the ‘utopian element’ of governing (2010: 38).

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20 On this argument, Miller and Rose contend mechanisms of security are realised through ‘a functioning network’ made up of ‘delicate affiliations’ (1990: 9-10). Nevertheless, to emphasise the relations between these elements, I maintain the term ‘assemblage’ as relevant.

21 Commenting on the heterogeneity of authorities, Rose draws attention to the ‘conflicts’ between them (1999a: 21).
The strategic logic and ontology of PREVENT can be framed as ‘critical analysis in which one tries to see how the different solutions to a problem have been constructed’ (Foucault, 1997: 284). The most prominent criticism levelled at PREVENT concerns ‘Othersing’ practices of surveillance (see Kundnani, 2009; Durodie, 2016). Framed as a political rationality, the CTSA can be read as a moral endeavour which distances PREVENT from socio-demographic profiling and fixed indicators which pre-figure terrorism. Under a safeguarding logic, PREVENT abandons linear, ‘conveyor belt’ factors leading to terrorist involvement (see HM Government, 2018a: 32). Revised advice from the DfE clearly outlines: ‘there is no single way of identifying an individual who is likely to be susceptible to a terrorist ideology. As with managing other safeguarding risks, staff should be alert to changes in children’s behaviour which could indicate that they may be in need of help or protection’ (DfE, 2015: 6). Rather, the PREVENT Duty builds on ‘forms of professional intuition developed in safeguarding practice’ (Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2018: 42). Professional practitioners are subsequently encouraged to use their ‘professional judgement’ in identifying ‘at risk’ individuals (DfE, 2015: 6). It would seem the detection of radicalisation has become guided by the principles of intuitive professional expertise.

This maps comfortably to the notion of political rationality, specifically, the critical exercise of power by experts. As Merlingen (2011: 155) highlights ‘expertise grounds governmentalities’. Moreover, a neoliberal notion of rationality emphasises self-determined decision-making that has crept into social responsibility arenas (Lemke, 2002). In the context of PREVENT, self-determined (intuitive) decision-making is far from concretised; precipitating factors for radicalisation have become arbitrary and capricious thus transforming the identification of behavioural signs towards a subjective realm. More than this, given the milieu of professional partners and reporting contexts, depoliticising counter-radicalisation as safeguarding serves a strategic purpose - that of operational linkage between and across diverse authorities.22 This fits Rose and Miller’s political rationality whereby ‘the problem

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22 On this argument, I am interpreting depoliticisation as the altering of (political) decision-making rather than simply the denial of political choice.
was one of connecting [diverse agents] to the calculations and deliberations of other authorities (1992: 291; adapted by present author).

Accordingly, it would seem the CTSA coincides with a re-reading of Foucault’s account of neoliberalism itself. Examining ‘advanced liberal government’ (rather than a generalised concern with neoliberal governmentality), Rose et al., (2006: 84) emphasise how projects of political rationalisation ‘are constantly undergoing modification in the face of some newly identified problem or solution’. Neoliberalism, according to Rose and Miller, ‘should be seen as a re-organisation of political rationalities that brings them into a kind of alignment with contemporary technologies of government (1992: 296). Chorusing Rose et al., (2006), Collier argues neoliberalism is not a form of knowledge-power or a kind of governmentality that establishes the ‘conditions of possibility’ for thinking and acting in a certain way (2009: 99-100). For Collier, ‘it is a form of thinking, a kind of reflection that aims to critique and remediate existing mentalités and practices of government that have become uncertain or problematic’ (2009: 100; emphasis added). A political rationality thus ‘problematises’ a certain aspect of the social world, and offers a programmatic and rhetorical framework through which ‘programmes of government’ can be developed in response to an identified problem (Stockdale, 2014: 181-2, 100). Much in the same way, the concept of problematisation helps unpack the intertwining of counter-radicalisation and social care. It is this concept the article now turns.

Problematising PREVENT: Counter-Radicalisation Assemblage

Rose and Miller (1992) state the ideals of government are a ‘problematising activity’. Problematisation is circulated around the ‘failings it seeks to rectify’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 279) and the resultant formation is a ‘complex assemblage’ between heterogeneous forces and diverse authorities (Rose and Miller, 1992: 281). An assemblage relates to alignments which

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23 Foucault frames ‘problems’ or ‘solutions’ in response to ‘urgency’ and ‘crisis’, whereas Rose and Miller use the general term ‘problematic’. I do not submit that the implementation of the CTSA can be reduced to a single case of urgency or crisis.

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are forged and the ‘the will to govern as a point of convergence and fracture’ (Li, 2007: 268). Li’s (2007) concept of ‘problematisation’ is particularly instructive when analysing how heterogeneous elements are ‘assembled and ordered to hold together and endure both across differences and through differences’ (Anderson et al., 2012: 177). For Li (2007), ‘problematising’ is an important element in the assemblage, and analysis of ‘how problems come to be defined ... in relation to particular schemes of thought, diagnosis of deficiency and promises of improvement’ remains important, alongside questions of how knowledge is rendered technical and depoliticised; how alliances are forged, and how failures and contradictions are reincorporated into the assemblage (de Goede and Simon, 2013: 319). Central to this is the construction of knowledge which is rendered technical and depoliticised; and how problems become reproblematised (redefined).

Similarly to the Nuansa training programme in the Netherlands, PREVENT encompasses a complex assemblage that does not definitively and coherently act but is rather a ‘generative flux of forces and relations that work to produce particular realities’ (Law, 2004: 7). Recasting counter-radicalisation as safeguarding consolidates PREVENT as a ‘broad descriptor of different historical relations coming together, as an ethos oriented to the ‘instability’ of interactions, and the potential for novelty and spatiotemporal difference, and as a concept for thinking the relations between stability and transformation in the production of the social’ (Anderson et al., 2012: 171-172, italics in original). In keeping with this theoretical framing, PREVENT can be read - not merely as the functional outcome of a social problem – but as a problematisation that is a contingent construction shaped by its ideational conditions of emergence (Merlingen, 2011: 153).

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24 Nuansa is a knowledge-gathering group for frontline professionals involved in CoPPrA and RecoRa programmes in the Netherlands (see de Goede and Simon, 2013). RecoRa workshoped best practice amongst frontline professionals from the UK, the Netherlands, and Germany (de Goede and Simon, 2013). CoPPrA is a Belgian initiative that relates to the development of training materials for frontline practitioners to spot signs of radicalisation (de Goede and Simon, 2013).
Reflections on ‘assemblage’ are suggestive here. In discussing the internal dynamism of assemblages, the emphasis is squarely on bringing together the heterogeneous entities into some form of temporary relation (or set of relations) without presupposing that these relations necessarily constitute an organism (Anderson et al., 2012: 177). Anderson further delineates assemblage as both the ‘provisional holding together of a group of entities across differences and a continuous process of movement and transformation as relations and terms change’ (Anderson et al., 2012: 177). In the context of PREVENT, the term ‘provisional’ is crucial given the coherency within coalitions of (counter-terrorism) practice has been critically questioned (see O’Toole et al., 2015; Fussey, 2013; Dresser, 2015, 2018; Thomas, 2017).

But how might heterogeneous entities converge? To put it differently, how do the heterogeneous elements that constitute an assemblage ‘function together?’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977: 39). For Deleuze (1992), the answer is found in the centrality of language and expression. This assertion finds support in work by Deleuze and Guattari (1987, [2004]: 407) who term assemblage a ‘constellation’ that can be divided on two axes. It is the second of these axes that is of concern to the current discussion: ‘enunciation’ (Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 81). Enunciation refers to a collection of languages, words and meanings; a provisional unity is produced through the ‘co-functioning’ of words (Deleuze and Parnet, 2006: 52, emphasis added). The article returns to this concept in the following section.

While the notion of assemblage sheds light on the CTSA, there is a further dynamic to problematising PREVENT. The PREVENT Duty requires a pluralistic assemblage in which subsidiary authorities possess a significant degree of autonomy in terms of practically pursuing the objectives of PREVENT. Specified authorities ‘autonomatised’ through the CTSA are simultaneously ‘responsibilised’ to act in PREVENT’s name. The resultant formation is loose and flexible linkages between those who are ‘separated spatially and temporally, and between events in spheres that remain formally distinct and autonomous’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 282). In different terms, while the CTSA acts as an overarching structure which guides the behaviour of responsibilised bodies, authorities possess a degree of autonomy through which the aims PREVENT are implemented. As the CTSA outlines,
specified authorities are expected to fully comply with the PREVENT Duty, however, how bodies participate is dependent upon a range of factors (HM Government, 2015b). This includes responding to a localised understanding of risk, rather than following the dictates of a central authority. The revised PREVENT Duty makes clear PREVENT is concerned with ‘understanding, shared with partners, of the potential risk in the local area’ (HM Government, 2015b: 10; emphasis added). Within this, police are said to galvanise local PREVENT partnerships alongside a ‘wide range of organisations to support local delivery of PREVENT (HM Government, 2015b 18; emphasis added).

Training to recognise vulnerability similarly considers ‘local processes and policies’ that will enable staff ‘to make referrals to the CHANNEL programme’ (HM Government, 2015b: 15). This may entail details of a police counter-terrorism local profile (CTLP) which outlines the threat, vulnerability and risk from extremist activity relating to terrorism within a specific area (HM Government, 2012b). To put this into context, research by Heath-Kelly and Strausz found ‘only 27% of NHS Trusts in PREVENT priority areas of England had integrated PREVENT into their Safeguarding policies, while 73% had stand-alone PREVENT policies’ (2018a: 33). They further found ‘four Mental Health Trusts (of 54 in England) currently include radicalisation criteria in their Comprehensive Risk Assessments for all service users’ (Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2018a: 3). This adds a coercive element to governmental strategies that operate, as far as possible, ‘through’ rather than ‘against’ the desires and interests of their target population (Dean, 1999: 209).

This, then, is not entirely governmentality. The notion of a highly centralised governmental apparatus where power is practiced as an antithesis of freedom and agency does not provide an adequately nuanced account of PREVENT (c.f. McKee, 2009; Stockdale, 2014). While reconfiguring PREVENT as ‘safeguarding’ provides a set of consistent ‘regularities’, how PREVENT is enacted is subject to contextual variation and local autonomy. This practical variation of PREVENT finds commonality with Rose and Miller’s conceptual account of political rationalities which ‘do not have the systematic and closed character of disciplined bodies of theoretical discourse’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 178). While
political rationalities provide an operable pattern, the exercising of power by diverse authorities is subject to situational variance (Rose and Miller, 1992: 175). Rose and Miller (2008, 1992) further outline political rationalities render reality thinkable in such a way that it is amenable to political deliberations. ‘Problematisations of (potential) host societies provide an important input into these deliberations’ (Merlingen, 2011:157). The success of this depends on political rationalities and problematisations that frame their interests in a manner that resonates with members. This is because political rationalities are morally coloured, grounded upon knowledge, and made thinkable through language (Rose and Miller, 1992). The article now turns to towards theoretically exploring PREVENT as a technology of government with attentiveness directed towards the governance of PREVENT.

Technologies of Government: Governing through Language

In elucidating the problematics of government, Rose and Miller (1992) delineate the intricate inter-dependency between political rationalities and technologies of government (c.f. Miller and Rose, 1990). For Rose and Miller, it is through technologies of government that political rationalities become operable and thus capable of deployment. In the context of clarity, it is worth outlining the concept of technology. Drawing upon Foucault, Rose defines technology as:

‘...Any assembly structure by a practical rationality governed by a more or less conscious goal. Human technologies are hybrid assemblages of knowledge, instruments, persons, systems of judgment, building and spaces, underpinned at the programmatic level by certain presuppositions about, and objectives for, human beings’ (Rose, 1996: 131-132).

However, for now, I simply wish to highlight that governmental technologies entail the ‘complex of mundane programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental...
ambitions’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 273). Furthermore, in accounting for state transformations and policies, the ‘humble and mundane mechanisms by which authorities seek to instantiate government’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 281) are intrinsically linked to developments in knowledge, powers of expertise, and the (re)configuration of sovereignty.

Drawing upon the work of Bruno Latour, Rose and Miller outline the concept of inscription devices which characterise the ‘material conditions which enable thought to work upon an object’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 283). Inscription is said to be the means of acting upon the real - a way of ‘devising techniques for inscribing it in such a way as to make the domain in question susceptible to evaluation, calculation and intervention’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 283). Knowledge practices are thus inscribed in ‘centres of calculation’ that ‘are in the know about that which they seek to govern’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 284; emphasis added). Authorities, in Rose and Miller’s terms, confer new visibilities of knowledge as centres of calculation. When connected together these components play a ‘decisive role within a programme of government that elevated a desire to know the nation and its subjects in fine detail into an essential resource of political rule’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 285).

Not merely a conflict resolution tool, the CTSA reconfigures PREVENT as a ‘professional matter’ to be ‘resolved by the application of rational knowledge and professional expertise’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 294). Importantly, however, the knowledge practices that cast identification of potential future radicals re-inscribe the imaginative geography of the individual at risk of radicalisation inside the spaces of everyday life (Amoore, 2009). The CTSA inaugurates authorities that already have extensive contact with public to statutorily operationalise counter-radicalisation as a pre-existing safeguarding measure. In the context of governance, the CTSA might be read as an attempt to (de)politically legitimise counter-radicalisation as it permeates the core of day-to-day actuarial practices of mundane social care environments. As the revised PREVENT guidance states, the PREVENT Duty does not ‘confer ‘new functions on any specified authority’ (HM Government 2015b: 2) but is expected to be incorporated into ‘existing policies and
procedures, so it becomes part of the *day-to-day* work of the authority’ (HM Government 2015b: 6; *emphasis added*).

Depoliticising ideological extremism within broader types of preventable abuse consolidates an overarching protectionist agenda intertwined with anticipatory security, particularly the deployment of ways of governing through uncertainty (O’Malley, 2004). This should, in theory, augment intelligence and information capture as it transforms the distinction between normality and exception. Moreover, this modifies an understanding of the relationship between politics, risk and sovereignty in ways similar to observations made by Aradau et al., (2008: 152) who state:

‘The architecture of the normal takes shape through heterogeneous and mundane actuarial practices, through the arbitrary declarations of risky-ness and bureaucratic reallocation of power. The imperceptible and unknowable captured by technologies of risk are re-inscribed upon concrete everydayness, thereby colonising normality. Rather than the limit of normality, risk infuses exceptionalism within the governmentality of everydayness’.

Similarly, governmentalisation of the state is said to legitimate and regulate at the same time (Rose and Miller, 1992). Rose and Miller make this clear in conceptualising governmental technologies as ‘mobile and ‘thixotropic’ associations (that) are established between a variety of agents, in which each seeks to enhance their powers by ‘translating’ the resources provided by the association so that they may function to their own advantage’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 282; adapted by present author). In light of this, Ragazzi draws attention to an ‘increased submission of social policy actors and their practices to the logics of security and social control’ (2017: 1). This poses two critical questions: ‘what lexicon is drawn on to make sense of the problem?’ (Merlingen, 2011: 152). And, ‘by means of what vocabulary do authorities frame reality in a way that makes it amenable to intervention?’ (Merlingen, 2011: 152). In answering such, it is not that mundane practices of social care have become transformed by the language and practice of security through PREVENT; rather, it is the reverse process
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(Durodie, 2016). It is also not the case that language determines outcomes, but that intersubjective understandings formed through discursive practice delimit spaces for agency, and thus have a causal effect on what outcomes are possible (Fisher, 2012).

Rose and Miller’s concept of ‘translation’ as a technology of government usefully captures moving from one condition to another through a revised composition of diversity. They summarise the notion of translation: ‘to the extent that actors have come to understand their situation according to a similar language and logic, to construe their goals and their fate as in some way inextricable, they are assembled into mobile and loosely affiliated networks’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 282). Going back to counter-terrorism, as I found elsewhere (see Dresser, 2015), it was only after PREVENT police officers reconceptualised PREVENT as ‘safeguarding’ that professional partners recognised their role in counter-radicalisation. Re-orientating PREVENT towards an invocation of care was said to help embed partners’ expertise at local level (Dresser, 2015). In fact, for PREVENT police officers, terminology such as ‘PREVENT’ and ‘counter-terrorism’ were considered rather meaningless and counter-productive (Dresser, 2015). On the other hand, safeguarding was embedded in the lexicon and day-to-day practice of key partners (Dresser, 2015). These findings fit with the concept of governmental technologies which are said to make other actors ‘accept its problematisation, goals and projects associated with it and that enable it to enrol them as allies’ (Merlingen, 2011: 155; adapted by present author). In this vein, Rose and Miller suggest political discourse should be seen as an ‘intellectual machinery for rendering reality thinkable in such a way that it is amenable to political deliberations’ (1992: 277). Within this, common modes of perception are formed, in which certain events and entities come to be visualised ‘according to particular rhetorics of image or speech’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 282).

While language acts as a technology designed for shaping the conduct of governance, we must be wary of eagerly positing the resultant architecture embodies a stabilised network of power. This is particularly so given the contested nature of counter-terrorism governance. For instance, research by Heath-Kelly and Strausz (2018b) illuminates PREVENT’s imperfect fit with the NHS’ safeguarding infrastructure, with less than half of respondents agreeing that
PREVENT is a genuine safeguarding procedure. They also draw attention to how health care professionals renegotiated the provisions of the Care Act to appropriate the PREVENT Duty within health care settings. This was said to reduce professional dissonance given the inconsistencies between PREVENT and existing safeguarding structures (Heath Kelly and Strausz, 2018b).

With this in mind, Rose and Miller suggest it is through political discourse that ‘relations are established between the nature, character and causes of problems facing various individuals and groups – producers and shopkeepers, doctors and patients’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 282). Similarly, and in a Foucauldian sense, language helps embed expertise into multi-agency counter-radicalisation whereby ‘behaviour is either normalised or pathologised by teachers, doctors and social workers who emerge as the new ‘judges of normality’’ (Foucault, 1975: 304). However, unlike Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power, power in this sense is far more rhizomatic, and inscribed through mundane practices. This theoretical framing shares common ground with Home Office advice:

‘Preventing someone from becoming a terrorist or from supporting terrorism is substantially comparable to safeguarding in other areas, including child abuse or domestic violence … The Department of Health has also supported the review of the ‘No Secrets’ guidance on safeguarding [vulnerable] adults. This will embed the principles of PREVENT within existing processes for safeguarding vulnerable adults and enable healthcare workers across the country to understand the parallels between PREVENT and existing support and intervention processes’ (HM Government, 2011a: 83–84; emphasis added).

While Foucault’s aim was to ‘cut off the king’s head’ in political analysis, it is language which allows PREVENT to govern as a ‘headless body as if it indeed has a head’ (Dean, 1994: 156). This is because language is not merely a justification, nor a semiotic proposition; language is a performative practice (Rose and Miller, 1992). The CTSA fuses specified authorities together through a (de)politicalised language of care. Central to this is a legislative
Intersection between pastoral responsibility and security. As Rose and Miller observe: ‘the enactment of legislation is a powerful resource in the creation of centres, to the extent that law translates aspects of a governmental programme into mechanisms that establish, constrain, or empower certain agents or entities and set some of the key terms of their deliberations’ (1992: 287).

Rather than a focus on the ‘governing of conduct’, the CTSA can be read as ‘conduct[ing] [of] government’; that is, technologies directed at improving governance (Wittendorp, 2016). Commenting on the ordering of counter-terrorism within the EU, Wittendorp (2016) draws attention to an ‘Anti-Terrorism Road Map’ which was subsequently revised as an ‘Action Plan’ following the 2004 Madrid bombings. The Action Plan - framed by Wittendorp as a governmental technology – included a list of measures designed to make the governing process more efficient (Wittendorp, 2016). This entailed collapsing several documents together to address the duplication of work. An additional function was that of monitoring the state of policy implementation (Wittendorp, 2016).

The CSTA - as a legislative instrument - can similarly be framed as governmental technology which maintains overview as part of the governing process. The CTSA is attentive (and thus targets) the governing process itself, specifically, bringing the ‘present state of implementation’ in line with a ‘desired one’ (Wittendorp, 2016: 479-480). For example, section 32(A) of the CTSA allows the Secretary of State to enforce the performance of PREVENT when any specified authority has failed to execute its PREVENT Duty. Likewise, the Strategic Policing Requirement monitors police forces’ contribution to the PREVENT Duty, with the Home Secretary able to direct a Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) to take specific action to address any specific failure in relation to PREVENT (HM Government 2016: 20). In the context of education, any school and college unable to satisfy the PREVENT(ive) requirements enforced by the Office for Standards in Education may be subject to intervention or find themselves the subject of a termination in funding. Within health settings, local safeguarding forums - including local commissioners and providers of
NHS Services - oversee the fulfilling the PREVENT Duty and are said to ensure effective delivery (HM Government, 2015a).

This coincides with Rose and Miller’s conceptualisation of governance as ‘a congenitally failing operation: the sublime image of a perfect regulatory machine is internal to the mind of the programmers’ (1992: 190). Legislatively reconfiguring PREVENT as safeguarding depolitically legitimates PREVENT within social care environments, however, this runs parallel to bureaucratic managerialism which has become manifest in UK counter-terrorism. It is therefore unsurprising that since the implementation of the CTSA, PREVENT reports and referrals have increased (see HM Government, 2017 and 2018). Whether this demonstrates “effective” counter-radicalisation or a ‘culture of compliance’ (McGovern, 2016) is unclear.

Conclusion

Inspired by Rose and Miller’s theoretical frame, an argument has been presented using political philosophy to contextualise PREVENT as having undergone a process of rectification; this entails the reconfiguration of PREVENT towards safeguarding. Of particular interest has been the CTSA which, as highlighted, collapses PREVENT into a pre-existing safeguarding apparatus. To understand the resultant formation, this article has drawn attention to three key areas of analysis: ‘political rationalities’, ‘problematisations’, and ‘technologies of government’. This political matrix should not be considered outside one another; rather, power operates in and through these concepts and thus, it is the connections between these dimensions that political discourse is circumscribed and reiterated (Foucault, 2007).

While the CTSA demonstrates a politics of government encompassing rationalities, problematisations, and technologies, it is intimately connected to contingent processes of governance. In an attempt to move beyond reified critiques of PREVENT centred around internal practices of surveillance and ‘Otherising’, this article has travelled a path less taken.
and considered the material practices of governing. As argued, the original genealogy of
governmentality demonstrates theoretical limitations, namely, the ‘fundamental inability to
account for why the governance subject, constituted through discourse, fails to turn up in
practice’ (McKee, 2009: 473-474). Thus, a concretised reading of governmentality as
disciplinary regulation does not provide an adequately nuanced account of PREVENT for two
reasons. First, it would be fallacy to disregard the degree of local autonomy specified
authorities possess in the context in implementing the PREVENT Duty. While the CTSA
provides an ‘operable pattern’ of governance, how diverse authorities carry out the
PREVENT Duty is subject to situational variance. Second, the concept of resistance must be
considered given the messy actualities of PREVENT in situ (O’Toole et al., 2016; Thomas,
2017; Dudenhoefer, 2018; Dresser, 2015, 2018). As this article has argued, the domains of
governance are inherently political involving ‘conflicts over definition’ and whereby ‘[the]
implementation of public policies are struggled over by political professionals’ (Swarz, 2003:
151, adapted by present author). How structure and agency operate and relate within this
context is therefore analytically important. Political analysis navigates this conundrum as it
helps illuminate ‘bureaucratic struggles, forms of symbolic competition, as well as how
categories of suspicion, established in official policy documents, become translated, enacted
and re-appropriated in local contexts by street-level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 1980 cited in
Regazzi, 2016: 8-9).

This article has also explored the construction of knowledge which is rendered
technical and (de)politicised, as well as how problems become reproblematised within the
micro-practices of everydayness. Through the CTSA, the production of ‘at risk’ subjectivities
are shaped by, though not limited to, psychology, psychiatry and pedagogy (Rose, 1999b). In
considering this, the language and practice of security have been transformed by mundane,
actuarial practices of social care rather than vice versa. The centrality of language plays an
important role as the revised ‘politico-ethical aspirations’ of PREVENT are enacted (Rose
and Miller, 1992: 294). The resultant assemblage is a provisional unity produced through a
(hoped for) co-functioning of words.
The primary messages contained in this paper should be of interest to a wide audience given the burgeoning body of actors tasked with counter-radicalisation on the ground. It is hoped the arguments presented provide a novel perspective of counter-radicalisation in ways which allow further analytical arguments and/or debates to emerge. Moving forward, it is important that scholars critically consider the fusing of disparate actors within a complex, ever-shifting counter-radicalisation assemblage; actors who arguably have no more unity than the fact that government policy has stitched them together. In considering PREVENT, it would be fruitful for future research to explore the ways counter-radicalisation is actualised, implemented and performed. Doing so will help a more nuanced account of PREVENT to be realised.

To finish, Rose and Miller modestly conceded their political analysis was preliminary; nevertheless, an attempt has been made to extend their analytical frame as an explanatory mechanism applied to pre-emptive security. While the primary messages of this article are similarly conceptual in nature, they provide a reconstituted understanding of PREVENT through a critical examination of the intertwining of social care structures and counter-radicalisation.
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ISSN: 2363-9849

Editors in Chief: Daniel Koehler